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Abstract
Our purpose in this paper is to produce a tractable model which illuminates prob-
lems relating to individual bank behaviour and risk-taking, to possible contagious inter-
relationships between banks, and to the appropriate design of prudential requirements and
incentives to limit ‘excessive’ risk-taking. Our model is rich enough to include heterogenous
agents (commercial banks and investors), endogenous default, and multiple commodity, and
credit and deposit markets. Yet, it is simple enough to be eﬀectively computable. Financial
fragility emerges naturally as an equilibrium phenomenon.
In our model a version of the liquidity trap can occur. Moreover, the Modigliani-Miller
proposition fails either through frictions in the (nominal) financial system or through incen-
tives, arising from the imposed capital requirements, for diﬀerential investment behaviour
because of capital requirements. In addition, a non-trivial quantity theory of money is
derived, liquidity and default premia co-determine interest rates, and both regulatory and
monetary policies have non-neutral eﬀects.
The model also indicates how monetary policy may aﬀect financial fragility, thus high-
lighting the trade-oﬀ between financial stability and economic eﬃciency.
∗The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of England,
London School of Economics, or the University of Oxford.
†We are grateful to S. Bhattacharya, H.M. Polemarchakis, H.S. Shin and seminar participants at the Bank
of England, the 7th Annual Macroeconomic Conference, Crete, the 2nd Oxford Finance Summer Symposium,
Oxford, the Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research, and the VI SAET Conference, Rhodes for helpful
comments. However, all remaining errors are ours.
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1 Introduction
It is a truism that the structure of a model needs to reflect the practical purposes which drive
the research in the first place. In our case, we work for the Financial Stability wing of the Bank
of England; our aim is to construct a model which illuminates problems relating to individual
bank behaviour and risk-taking, to possible contagious inter-relationships between banks, and
to the appropriate design of prudential requirements and incentives to limit ‘excessive’ risk-
taking.
In order to reduce a model of the aggregate economy to manageable proportions, a common
simplification is to assume that each sector has agents which behave identically, so that they
can be presented in ‘representative agent’ format. So, in most models the banking system is
represented by a single agent, which can either be viewed as a set of perfectly competitive
identical banks, or, on occasions, as a single, monopolistic bank.
While the representative agent approach has many uses and advantages, applying it to
the banking system inevitably obscures many of the economic and behavioural relationships,
notably between banks, in which a regulatory authority is closely interested. For example,
with a single ‘representative’ bank, there can be no interbank market. Again, either the whole
banking system, as represented by the one agent, fails, or the whole banking system survives
in face of some assumed shock. Typically in reality individual banks have diﬀering portfolios,
often reflecting diﬀering risk/return preferences. So, typically, failures occur with the greatest
probability amongst the riskiest banks. Such failures in turn generate interactions in the system
more widely that may threaten the survival of other banks, a process of contagion. This may
have several channels, both in interbank relationships more directly, and via changes in asset
market flows and prices that may involve other sectors, e.g. persons and companies. Such
interactions can hardly be studied in a model with a single representative bank, since many of
these interactions, e.g. the interbank market, are ruled out by definition.
So the main innovation in our model is to incorporate a number of commercial banks.
Each bank is distinguished by a unique risk/return preference. Since each bank is, and is
roughly perceived as being, diﬀerent, it follows that there is not a single market either for
bank loans or bank deposits.1 Instead, we assume that there is a separate market, with
diﬀering interest rates, in each case. We also allow individual non-bank agents to diﬀer, with
diﬀering utility functions, and, hence diﬀering attitudes towards potential bankruptcy; we also
model in their case the incentives for avoiding bankruptcy, as we do in the case of the banks.
Again we assume that the banks can observe the agents’ diﬀering riskiness with noise. This
means that each borrower faces a diﬀerent credit market. If each bank had its own individual,
idiosyncratic information on each borrower, then if there were H borrowers and B banks,
there would be H!B!(H−1)!(B−1)! bilateral markets for borrowing. If we assume, instead, that each
bank has the same information on each borrower, an implausible assumption, then competition
between banks would mean that there would be H separate markets. Alternatively, we can
assume that borrowers have been pre-allocated at time t=0 to a particular bank, and that
that allocation provides each respective bank with specialised information; such additional
information allows them, for asymmetric information standard reasons, to lend cheaper than
any other bank. Consequently there are B separate credit markets between each bank and a
subset of borrowers that were initially randomly allocated.
This means that, instead of a single market for deposits/loans, we have multiple markets
1There would be such a single market if there was 100% complete deposit insurance in place, since then
all deposits would be similarly riskless in any bank. We could adjust the market to take account of deposit
insurance, with varying coverage, in future extensions.
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for deposits (by separate bank) and for loans (by borrower and bank). Given the optimising
conditions for the individual banks, after assuming an initial allocation of capital, the open
market operations of the Central Bank, etc., etc., deposits may not be suﬃcient in each indi-
vidual bank (plus capital), to finance that bank’s asset portfolio (of cash, loans and Central
Bank (public sector) debt), although within the banking sector as a whole outside liabilities
must equal outside assets, and interest rates and/or cash flows adjust until that happens. So,
deficit (surplus) banks borrow (lend) on the interbank market. In reality the interbank market
is also segmented with banks of diﬀering riskiness either borrowing at diﬀerent rates, or facing
limited ‘caps’ on such borrowing. At this stage in our exercise, however, we shall assume a
single, undiﬀerentiated interbank market with a common interest rate.
Since our focus is on financial fragility, the governance (public sector) institutions which
we introduce are a financial regulator and a Central Bank; these two may, or may not, be the
same institution, but will be assumed to cooperate where necessary. We abstract from fiscal
policy. The financial regulator sets the penalties/incentives on bankruptcy in both the banking
and the non-banking private sector, and also the required (minimum) capital adequacy ratios.
The Central Bank is established at time t = 0 with an allocation of (public sector, safe,
fixed nominal value) debt as its assets. Against this it has as its liabilities cash, commercial
banks reserve deposits and Central Bank debt. Reserve deposits and Central Bank debt are held
by the commercial banks only, in an initial allocation, against an equivalent initial allocation
of capital. Central Bank open market operations exchange its own (interest-bearing) debt
for (non-interest bearing) deposits. Moreover, the Central Bank can lend, or borrow, in the
interbank market.
In principle the non-bank public can insist on converting its commercial bank deposits
into currency or into Central Bank deposits. It is this convertibility commitment that forces
commercial banks to hold Central Bank deposits. Again we assume an initial allocation of
Central Bank cash to the public, and model the public’s choice between (safe) cash, which is
non-interest-bearing, and deposits, which are risky but interest-bearing, and can be used for
expenditures, and other risky (non-liquid) aspects.
The present model is based on the model introduced by Tsomocos (2003a) and (2003b)
which introduced a commercial banking sector and capital requirements in a general equilib-
rium model with incomplete markets, money and default. However, we depart by introducing
the possibility of capital requirements’ violation and consequent penalties and a secondary mar-
ket for the banks’ equity. Moreover, we introduce limited access to consumer credit markets,
thus allowing for diﬀerent interest rates across the commercial banking sector. Finally, we sim-
plify the model by removing the intratemporal loan markets and allow only for intertemporal
borrowing and lending.
The closest precursor to this approach is the work of Shapley and Shubik (1977), Shubik
(1973) and Shubik (1999) who introduced a central bank in a strategic market game. Shubik
(1973) also emphasised the virtues of explicitly modeling each transaction (see also Grand-
mont (1983), Grandmont and Laroque (1973), Grandmont and Younes (1972 and 1973) who
introduced a banking sector into general equilibrium with overlapping generations). The com-
mercial banking sector follows closely Shubik and Tsomocos (1992). The modeling of money
in an incomplete markets framework is akin to a series of models developed by Dubey and
Geanakoplos (1992, 2003a, and 2003b) and by Drèze and Polemarchakis (2000) and Drèze,
Bloise, and Polemarchakis (2002). Finally, default is modelled as in Dubey, Geanakoplos and
Shubik (2000), Shubik (1973), and Shubik and Wilson (1977), namely by subtracting a linear
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term from the objective function of the defaulter proportional to the debt outstanding.2
For the rest we have tried to keep this model as simple, standardised and parsimonious as
we can. The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we set out the basic form of
the model. In sections 3 and 4, we formally define the budget sets of the non-bank public,
commercial banks and Monetary Equilibrium with Commercial Banks and Default (MECBD).
In section 5, we show under which conditions a MECBD is achieved. We provide conditions
such that trade would be beneficial to traders even under the presence of positive interest
rates, and asset markets will be active irrespective of the possibility of positive default in
equilibrium. Thus in a MECBD positive default and financial fragility are compatible with the
orderly functioning of markets. So, given default and financial vulnerability, there is room for
economic policy to improve upon the ensuing ineﬃciencies.
A formal definition of financial fragility is proposed in section 6, borrowed from Tsomocos
(2003a and 2003b). Also, a Keynesian liquidity trap holds in equilibrium in which commodity
prices stay bounded whereas the volume of trade in the asset markets tends to infinity whenever
monetary policy is loosened. Also, whenever financial fragility is present in the economy, the
role of economic policy is justified. Regulatory policy is shown to be non-neutral. Moreover,
we address formally the Modigliani-Miller proposition and establish the conditions that cause
its failure. In section 7, we note that Hicksian elements of the demand for money are active in
equilibrium. We establish monetary non-neutrality that characterise the lack of the classical
dichotomy between the real and nominal sectors of the economy. We also show that a non-
trivial quantity theory of money holds and the liquidity structure of interest rates depends on
aggregate liquidity and default in the economy.
Using the principles derived, we proceed in section 8 to analyse a concrete comparative
statics change in computable general equilibrium models. We rationalise the outcomes by
tracing the new equilibrium. The results are based on the prior principles that must hold
simultaneously in equilibrium. For example, a change in monetary policy must satisfy con-
temporaneously the quantity theory of money, the liquidity structure of interest rates and
the Fisher relation. Finally, we conclude in section 9 and all the proofs are relegated in the
appendix.
This framework is more elaborate, but we believe that it also oﬀers new insights into the
analysis of financial fragility and systemic risk. We doubt whether contemporaneous models,
without heterogenous agents, can adequately handle analyses relating to liquidity, default and
contagion. After we gain experience with this model through parametric examples, we may
possibly be able to derive our comparative statics results in a more general context.
2 The Model
2.1 The Economy
Consider the standard general equilibrium model with incomplete markets (GEI) in which
time extends over two time periods (i.e. an endowment economy without production). The
first period consists of a single initial state and the second period consists of S possible states.
At t = 0, non-bank private sector (NBPS), commercial banks and the authorities take their
decisions expecting (rationally) the realisation of any one of the S possible future scenarios
to occur. At t = 1 one of the S states occurs and then again the economic actors take the
2Dubey and Geanakoplos (1992) have studied more general default specifications and also introduced the
gains-from-trade hypothesis that guarantees the positive value of fiat money in finite horizon.
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appropriate decisions. A detailed explanation of the sequence of events is contained in section
2.3 and figure 1. NBPS and commercial banks transact, maximising their respective objective
functions, whereas the Central Bank and the regulator are modelled as ‘strategic dummies’ (i.e.
their choices are exogenously fixed and are common knowledge to economic agents). NBPS
trade in commodities, financial assets, consumer loans, deposits and shares of commercial
banks. Commercial banks lend to the consumers and take deposits, they borrow and lend
in the interbank credit market, invest in the asset market and issue equity in the primary
market. The Central Bank operates in the interbank market via OMOs. The regulator fixes
the bankruptcy code for households and commercial banks exogenously and sets the capital-
adequacy requirements for commercial banks.
Formally, the notation that will be used henceforth is as follows:
t ∈ T = {0, 1} = time periods,
s ∈ S = {1, ..., S} = set of states at t = 1,
S∗ = {0} ∪ {S} = set of all states,
h ∈ H = {1, ...,H} = set of economic agents (households/investors),
b ∈ B = {1, ..., B} = set of commercial banks,
l ∈ L = {1, ..., L} = set of commodities,
RL+ ×RSL+ = commodity space indexed by {1, ..., S} × {1, ..., L}
eh ∈ RL+ ×RSL+ = endowments of households
mh ∈ RS∗+ = monetary endowments of households
eb ∈ RS∗+ = capital endowments of commercial banks
uh : RL+ ×RSL+ → R = utility function of agent h ∈ H,
χhsl = consumption of commodity l in state s by h ∈ H.
The standard assumptions hold:
(A1) ∀s ∈ S∗ and l ∈ L,
P
h∈H
ehsl > 0,
(i.e. every commodity is present in the economy).
(A2) ∀s ∈ S∗ and h (b) ∈ H (B), ehsl > 0 (ebsl > 0) for some l ∈ L , s ∈ S∗,
(i.e. no household (commercial bank) has the null endowment of commodities (capital) in
every state of the world).
(A3) Let A be the maximum amount of any commodity sl that exists and let 1 denote
the unit vector in RSL. Then ∃Q > 0 3 uh(0, ..., Q, ..., 0) > uh(A1) for Q in an arbitrary
component
(i.e. strict monotonicity in every component).3 Also, continuity and concavity are assumed.
Let ub(πb0,πb1, ...,πbs) : RS
∗
+ → R = objective function of commercial banks.
πbs = monetary holdings of b at s ∈ S∗.
A straightforward assumption is imposed.
(A4) Let Am be the maximum amount of money present in the economy and let 1 denote
the unit vector in RS
∗
. Then ∃Q > 0 3 ub(0, ..., Q, ..., 0) > u(Am1) for Q in an arbitrary
component.
3The results remain unaﬀected if, instead of the previous condition, we assume smoothness of uh.
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(i.e. strict monotonicity in every component).4 Also, continuity and concavity are assumed.
2.2 Central Bank and the Regulator
The Central Bank conducts open market operations in the interbank credit market (though it
could also do so by buying, or selling, its own debt instruments).5
Formally, the following vector gives the Central Bank’s action
(MCB, µCB,mCB) ≡ (MCB, µCB, (mCBbs )b∈B,s∈S∗)
where,
MCB = OMOs on behalf of the Central Bank,
µCB = bond sales by the Central Bank,
mCB = money financed Emergency Liquidity Assistance to commercial banks.
Note that the Central Bank is not required to spend less than it borrows; the existence of
equilibrium is compatible with the Central Bank printing money to finance its expenditures. All
the results hold for both cases (i.e. with or without money financing) except where otherwise
stated. Also, the Central Bank may fix the interbank interest rate ρ and then accommodate
the ensuing money demand.
Similarly, the following vector gives the regulator’s actions
(k,λ,ω) ≡ ((k¯t)t∈T , (λhsz)h∈H∪B,s∈S,n∈N ; (ωtj)t∈T,j∈Z)
where
kt = time-dependent capital requirements ∀b ∈ B,
λhsz = bankruptcy (or capital requirements violation) penalties imposed upon h ∈ H ∪ B
when contractual obligations are abrogated
z ∈ Z = {N} ∪ {J} ∪ {k1, k2} = {0∗, 01, ..., 0B} ∪ {01, ..., 0B} ∪ {1, ..., J} ∪ {k1, k2}
Z is the set of all credit and deposit markets (i.e. loan markets (01, ..., 0B), deposit markets
(0
1
, ..., 0
B
) and interbank markets (0∗)), secondary asset markets and time-dependent capital
requirements. (see section 2.4-2.6)
ωtj = risk-weights ∀b ∈ B,∀t ∈ T = {0, 1} and j ∈ {0, 1, ..., J}.
The risk weights may be functions of other macroeconomic variables such as aggregate
default levels as in Caterineu-Rabell, Jackson and Tsomocos (2003), interest rates, volumes of
trade, prices, etc. Consumer loans are bank specific (see section 2.5) whereas the interbank
credit market is an aggregate market where the Central Bank and all the commercial banks
participate. Finally, since our focus is on formulating a framework for financial stability and
not monetary policy, we have collapsed the interbank and the repo markets into one.
2.3 The Time Structure of Markets
At t = 0, the commodity, asset, equity, credit, deposit and interbank markets meet. At the
end of the first period consumption and settlement (including any bankruptcy and capital
requirements’ violation penalties) take places.
4The results remain unaltered if, instead of the previous condition, we assume smoothness of ub.
5LOLR assistance to commercial banks could also be modelled in this context, a subject for future analysis.
For more see Goodhart (1989) and Goodhart and Huang (1999).
6
At t = 1, commodity and equity markets meet again, loans, deposits and assets are de-
livered. At the end of the second period consumption and settlement for default and second
period capital requirements’ violations take place. Also, commercial banks are liquidated.
Figure 2 makes the time line of the model explicit.
2.4 Asset Markets
The set of assets is J = {1, ..., J}. Assets are promises sold by the seller in exchange for a
price paid by the buyer today. They are traded at t = 0 and the contractual obligations
are delivered at t = 1 for a particular state s ∈ S. An asset j ∈ J is denoted by a vector
Aj ∈ RS(L+1)+ indicating the collection of goods deliverable and the money at any future state
s ∈ S. Therefore, the asset market is summarised by an ((L+ 1)S)× J matrix A.
All the deliveries are made in money (outside cash or inside deposits/loans). When the
assets promise commodities the seller delivers the money equivalent of the value of the agreed
commodities at their spot prices in the relevant state. Whenever rank |J | = rank |S| the
capital markets are said to be complete whereas when rank |J | < rank |S| the markets are said
to be incomplete.
Furthermore, we assume
(A5) Aj 6= 0,∀j ∈ J
(i.e. no asset makes zero promises).
(A6) Aj ≥ 0,∀j ∈ J
(i.e. asset payoﬀs are non-negative).
Finally, note that agents do not hold positive endowments of assets and thus all sales of
assets are eﬀectively short sales.
Individuals are price takers in asset markets, where θj represent asset prices. Let bhj ≡
amount of money sent by h ∈ H ∪B in the market of asset j. Also, let qhj ≡ promises sold of
asset j by agent h ∈ H ∪B. In equilibrium, at positive levels of trade, 0 < θj <∞,
θj =
P
h∈H
bhj +
P
b∈B
bbjP
h∈H
qhj +
P
b∈B
qbj
for j ∈ J, h ∈ H, b ∈ B. All the asset markets meet contemporaneously; hence cash obtained
from the sale of asset j cannot be used for the purchase of another asset j
0 6= j. Thus, the
volume of trade in the asset market is aﬀected by the overall liquidity of the economy. In this
way monetary policy interacts with asset markets and influences asset prices (i.e. asset price
inflation channel).
2.5 Money, Credit, and Deposit Markets
Money is the stipulated means of exchange. All commodities can be traded for money, and (as
noted) all asset deliveries are exclusively in money. Money can be either inside or outside fiat
(see Gurley and Shaw (1960)). At the outset some individuals and banks hold net monetary
assets-outside money-(which includes Central Bank liabilities). Inside money is credit created
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1. OMOs (CB) 
2. Borrow and deposit in the interbank markets (B) 
3. Borrow and deposit in the commercial bank credit 
markets (B and H) 
4. Equity markets of banks (H) 
1. Trade in asset+commodity markets (H and B) 
1. Consumption at t=0 (H) 
2. Capital requirements’ violations penalties (B) 
Nature decides which of the s∈S occurs  
1. Commodity trading (H) 
2. Secondary tradings of banks’ equity (H) 
1. Assets deliver (H and B) 
2. Settlement of loans and deposits (H and B) 
3. Settlement of interbank loans and deposits (CB and B) 
4. Liquidation of commercial banks (CB) 
1. Consumption at t=1 (H) 
2. Default settlement  
(Penalties for capital requirements’ violations, loan/deposit 
repayment and asset deliveries (H and B)) 
CB= Central Bank 
B   = Commercial Banks 
H   = Households/ Investors 
t=0 
t=1 
Figure 1: The Time Structure of the Model
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by the banking sector through the credit markets in period 0, in part depending on current
monetary policy, and is matched by the individual borrowers’ debt obligation to the banks.
When the Central Bank undertakes expansionary OMOs, in the interbank market, the com-
mercial banks gain cash reserve assets matched by an interbank deposit liability to the Central
Bank. In turn, commercial banks lend to borrowers and accept deposits. This represents an
asset of the commercial bank and thus a liability to investors. The net assets of the private
sector as a whole remain unchanged. Cash-in-advance is required for any purchase.
A market involves a symmetric exchange between two instruments. Just as agents cannot
sell money which they do not have in a market, so in the model agents cannot sell commodities
they do not have. The only exceptions are assets, credit and deposit markets, where we allow
agents to write their own promises (bonds).
Money enters the economy in three ways. First, it may be present at the outset (t = 0)
in the private endowments of agents and commercial banks. Agent h ∈ H has an endowment
mh of money, ∀s ∈ S∗ and commercial banks have initial capital endowment ebs, ∀s ∈ S∗, part
of which may be held in cash or deposits at the Central Bank. Second, when the Central
Bank lends on the interbank market, or purchases bonds with currency or the government
engages in money financed fiscal transfers, then the money stock increases. Third, previously
issued Central Bank bonds, or interbank loans, are repaid; money then exits the system via
redemptions of debt from investors and from commercial banks.
Agents are permitted to borrow from, and deposit with, each particular commercial bank.
However, borrowers are distributed initially to a particular bank from which they borrow.
This may be a result of relationship banking, or some other informational advantage that
a commercial bank has with particular borrowers. This restricted participation assumption
generates diﬀerent interest rates charged by commercial banks, but could be relaxed in more
complicated versions of the model.
So, let us partition H = {1, ...,H} to {hα1 , ..., hαk} ∪ {hb1, ..., hbl} ∪ ... ∪ {hB1 , ..., hBm} disjoint
sets whose union is H. Let the generic element of a subset Hb be hb indicating the particular
agent who can borrow from b ∈ B. Note that h ∈ H can deposit in any commercial bank she
wishes.
(A7) Each hb ∈ Hb can only borrow from b ∈ B (i.e. restricted participation in lending
markets)
Let µh
b
be the amount of fiat money agent hb ∈ Hb chooses to owe on the loan market of
bank b. If all agents repay exactly what they owe, then ∀b ∈ B we must have that,
1 + rb =
P
hb∈Hb
µh
b
mb
where mb is the amount of credit that commercial banks extend which is also subject to
their capital requirements set by the regulator (see section 2.6).
Thus, the ratio of nominal value of loans over loans supply (i.e. commercial banks credit
extension) determines the gross nominal interest rate. We add that rb is the ex ante nominal
interest rate that incorporates both the liquidity and default premium of loans since default is
permitted in equilibrium. The eﬀective (ex post) interest is suitably adjusted to account for
default on loans.
Similarly, there exist B deposit markets, one for each commercial bank, in which investors
may deposit funds. Note, that we do not impose the limited participation assumption on the
diﬀerent deposit markets.
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Let µbd be the demand of deposits by each b ∈ B and dhb the amount of deposits that each
h ∈ H deposits with each b ∈ B. If all deposits are repaid fully by commercial banks, the
∀b ∈ B we must have that
1 + rbd =
µbdP
h∈H
dhb
The deposit rates need not be the same as the lending rate since the parties involved in each
market will, in principle, manifest diﬀerent default patterns in equilibrium. Moreover, even
though we have removed the limited participation assumption, deposit rates would in general
be diﬀerent since diﬀerent banks may make diﬀerent choices as to their respective repayment
rates. Thus, as with lending rates so the deposit rates would also incorporate default and
liquidity premia in equilibrium.
These financial assets, bank loans, bank deposits, and bank equities (but not commodities)
can be inventoried; they are the only stores of value in our model.
2.6 Capital Requirements
As already mentioned in section 2.1, the regulator sets the banks’ minimum capital require-
ments. Given that the assets of commercial banks consist of loans (including interest rate pay-
ments), investments in marketable assets and some initial distribution of government bonds,
the capital requirements constraint becomes,
kt ≤
ebs +
P
h∈H
ψhb
ωt(η,σ)R
b
sm
b(1 + rb) +
P
j∈J
ωtj(η,σ)Rsj(psAjs)
µ
bbj
θj
¶
+ ωt(η,σ)Rbsdb(1 + ρ)
, ∀s ∈ S∗, b ∈ B
The variables are defined as follows:
η ≡ set of macro variables,
σ ≡ choice variables of the investors and commercial banks,
ωt(·) ≡ risk-weights for loans,
ωtj(·) ≡ risk-weights for marketable assets,
ωt(·) ≡ risk weights for interbank market deposits,
ψhb ≡ equity of commercial banks,
ps ≡ commodity prices, ∀l ∈ L, s ∈ S,
ρ ≡ interbank interest rate
ebs ≡ commercial banks’ initial capital endowment ∀s ∈ S∗,
db ≡ amount of money that b ∈ B deposits in the interbank market
R0s ≡ expected rates of delivery of various instruments (see also section 2.7)
Capital requirements are set by the regulators at each t ∈ T,∀b ∈ B. However, evaluation
of the capital and the risk-weighted assets occur at each state’s, s ∈ S, prices, delivery rates,
initial capital endowments and capital adjustments. Banks may not necessarily hold the same
capital since precautionary capital over and above the regulatory minimum can vary across
banks. In addition, as we will describe in the next section, banks are allowed to violate the
capital requirements constraints, subject to a penalty payment.
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Note that credit requirements in the first period are calculated with respect to the realised
asset deliveries in the ex post equilibrium and not to the expected ex ante ones as in t = 0. The
impact of regulatory policy, since it aﬀects credit extension and banks’ portfolio composition,
is akin to the workings of monetary policy.
2.7 Default
Default can be either strategic or due to ill fortune. Lenders cannot distinguish whether
default (or equivalently capital requirements constraints’ violation) occurs because the debtors
are unable to honour their contractual obligations or they choose not to do so even though
they have the necessary resources. The default (or capital requirements’ violation) penalties
are proportional to the level of default (or violation). Their purpose is to induce debtors to
honour their obligation when they are able to do so and to refrain from making promises that
they know they will not honour in the future.
Let us define Dhsz = (1−vhsz)µh
b
(Dbsz = (1−vbsz)µb) where vhsz (vbsz) is the rate of repayment
by households (banks). Dhsz is the nominal value of debt under default in the credit markets
(analogously in the asset market, or on deposit and interest rate obligations). In practice,
default penalties and the bankruptcy code depend normally on the nominal values of debt and
are only adjusted at discrete intervals as the general level of prices increases. In the model,
nominal values are deflated so that penalties are real. Finally, note that households are not
allowed to default on their obligations either in the primary or secondary equity markets of
commercial banks.
Let the parameters λhsz (λbsz) represent the marginal disutility of defaulting for each ‘real’
dollar on liabilities in state s.6 Therefore, the payoﬀs to investors and commercial banks will
be respectively ∀s ∈ S∗,
Πhs (χhs , (Dhsz)z∈Z , ps) = uhs (χhs )−
P
z∈Z
λhsz[Dhsz]+
psgs
and
Πbs(πbs, (Dbsz)z∈Z , ps) = ubs(πbs)−
P
z∈Z
λbsz[Dbsz]+
psgs
where gs is the base basket of goods which serves as a price deflator with respect to which
the bankruptcy penalty is measured and
[c]+ ≡ max[0, c]
Also, since we allow commercial banks to violate their capital requirement constraints,
λbkt represents the marginal disutility of violating their capital requirement constraint for each
‘real’ dollar. Thus, we need to subtract from the payoﬀ of commercial banks the additional
term:
λbkt max[0, kt − k
b
s]
psgs
6We consider real penalties (i.e. non-pecuniary) to avoid interpersonal comparison of welfare. However, most
of the arguments hold with nominal penalties as well.
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Note that, since we allow for capital requirements’ violations, these do not appear in the
budget set of banks, but only in the objective function (see section 3.2). Since capital require-
ments constraints do not enter the commercial banks’ optimisation problem as constraints, it
is only the possibility of incurring the penalty for any violation that provides an incentive to
banks to fulfil their capital requirements. If, for example, λbkt = +∞, ∀b ∈ B, then commercial
banks would never violate their capital adequacy ratios.
This specification of default captures the idea (first introduced by Shubik and Wilson
(1997)) that utility decreases monotonically in the level of default. In equilibrium, agents
equalise the marginal utility of defaulting with the marginal disutility of the bankruptcy
penalty. Thus, the expected rates of delivery of interbank, loans, assets and deposits R =
(Rbs, R
b
s, Rsj , R
b
s) ∀s ∈ S, j ∈ J and b ∈ B are equal to actual rates of delivery in equilibrium.
This is a crucial ingredient of this model. It allows us to establish default as an equilibrium
phenomenon and produces diﬀerent interest rates in each credit market. Diﬀerent interest rates
are produced because diﬀerent risk attitudes and initial capital endowments of both individual
borrowers and commercial banks induce diﬀerent default levels that in turn generate diﬀerent
default risk premia in each credit market.
2.8 Commodity Markets
Commodity prices psl are taken as exogenously given by the agents. Let bhsl ≡ amount of fiat
money spent by h ∈ H to trade in the market of commodity sl ∈ L. In addition, let qhsl ≡
amount of good l ∈ L oﬀered for sales at state s ∈ S∗ by h ∈ H. Agents cannot sell commodities
they do not own, so qhsl ≤ ehsl. In equilibrium, at positive levels of trade 0 < psl <∞,
psl =
P
h∈H
bhslP
h∈H
qhsl
All markets meet simultaneously; hence cash obtained from the sale of commodity l at
state s cannot be used for the purchase of another commodity l ∈ L at some s ∈ S∗. This
institutional arrangement is a fundamental feature of a model that captures the importance of
liquidity constraints and the transaction demand for cash. Cash-in-advance constraints should
be viewed as liquidity constraints that distinguish commodities from liquid wealth. With-
out loss of generality one could extend the present model to accommodate diﬀerent liquidity
characteristics of commodities, or of other assets, by introducing liquidity parameters for each
commodity that would be determined in equilibrium.7
2.9 Commercial Banks
Commercial banks enter the model because of their importance both for enabling agents to
smooth consumption, for the transmission of monetary policy, and for contagion of financial
crises during periods of financial fragility.
Let b ∈ B = {1, ..., B} be the set of commercial banks. We assume:
(A8) perfectly competitive banking sector (i.e. commercial banks take interest rates and
asset prices as exogenously given)
7See section 3.3 for further discussion.
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Although each bank has a group of borrowers allocated to it in this model, we could think
of each bank as a set of similar competitive banks of the same type.
The balance sheet of commercial banks is as follows:
A L
Loans to individual agents Deposits from individual agents
Interbank deposits Interbank borrowing
Asset investments Equity
Similarly, the balance sheet of the Central Bank,
A L
Interbank loans Currency (Fiat money)
Government bonds
Money financed emergency liquidity assistance
Residual8
The modelling of banking behaviour here is akin to the portfolio balance approach of the
banking firm introduced by Tobin (1963 and 1982).
Shares of ownership of commercial banks are determined on a prorated manner as follows:
shb =
ψhbP
h∈H
ψhb
,∀b ∈ B
where ψhb ≡ amount of money oﬀered by h for ownership shares of banks b ∈ B, and
shb ≡ percentage of shares of ownership by h ∈ H acquired at t = 0 at the initial public
oﬀering of b ∈ B
As can be seen from the time structure of the model, at t = 1, ∀s ∈ S, retrading occurs
and the secondary bank equity market clears as follows:
θbs =
P
h∈H
bhsbP
h∈H
shsbV
b
s
,∀s ∈ S, b ∈ B
where bhsb ≡ amount of fiat money oﬀered by h ∈ H at s ∈ S for shares of ownership at the
secondary bank equity market of b ∈ B,
shsb ≡ percentage shares of ownership by h ∈ H sold at t = 1 at the secondary bank
equity market of b ∈ B, and finally V bs ≡ ebs +4(2b) (i.e. retained profits at s = 0, see section
3.2)
Also, shsb ≤ shb (i.e. no short sales of bank equity, for the sake of simplicity). Note that
dividends are not distributed at the end of t = 0, since our focus does not lie only on the
capital structure of commercial banks. At t = 1, the profits (if any) of commercial banks are
liquidated and distributed back to the individual owners according to their ownership shares,
(and for default penalties the same rule applies). This way we close the model. We also remark
that, because of the capital requirements’ violation penalty, banks will never go bankrupt and
8The residual entry in the balance sheet of the Central Bank accounts for the endogenous default in the
interbank market.
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therefore bank equity prices will be non-zero. The formal existence argument is presented in
section 5.
Finally, as will be discussed in section 6, we analyse not only the default channel and
liquidity trap for the banking system, but also the eﬀect on financial fragility of a collapse in
bank equity values.
2.10 Interbank Credit Market
The Central Bank conducts its monetary policy through OMOs in the interbank market,
(though other routes for OMOs are also possible in practice). Also, interbank lending and
borrowing occurs in this market. Alternatively, the Central Bank could set the interbank
interest rate and accommodate the ensuing excess demand (or supply) of liquidity.
The interbank interest rate is established in equilibrium at positive levels of trade,
(1 + ρ) =
P
b∈B
µb + µCBP
b∈B
db +MCB
where µb ≡ amount of zero coupon bonds issued by b ∈ B, or equivalently the amount
of money b chooses to owe in the interbank credit market, db = amount of money that b
deposits. Similarly, µCB ≡ amount of zero-coupon bonds issued by the Central Bank and
MCB ≡ Central Bank money supply.
Note that monetary policy is not symmetric since default can lead to varying responses
to the Central Bank’s OMOs actions. Also, the Central Bank could determine the interest
rate instead and let borrowing and lending equilibrate the market, as the current practice of
implementing monetary policy is nowadays.
3 The Budget Set
It is assumed that commodities are perishable, lasting only one period, and that each market
meets once in each period. In order to ensure that agents have the necessary liquidity before
they spend the order in which markets meet should be carefully chosen. Accordingly, the
interbank market meets first to enable commercial banks to acquire funds to supply in the credit
markets which in turn meet before commodity markets meet to allow investors to borrow, if
necessary, for their expenditures. However, if the time horizon is extended to a large T the order
does not very much matter as long as receipts from sales cannot be used contemporaneously
for the purchase of commodities.
As in Tsomocos (2003a, and 2003b), we assume that asset markets (as well as the banks’
equity market) clear automatically via a giant clearing house. Thus,we attempt to capture the
fact that financial markets clear faster than commodity markets.
3.1 Investors
Macro variables (η = (p, ρ, r, θ, s, R)) are determined in equilibrium and every agent takes
them as given. Agents are perfect competitors and therefore are price takers. The choice of
investors, h ∈ H, are determined by σh ∈
Ph(η) where,
σh = (χh, µhb , dhb , bh, qh,ψ
h, bhsb, s
h
sb, v
h) ∈ RLS∗+ × R+ × R+ × RLS
∗+J
+ × RLS
∗+J
+ × RB+ ×
RSB+ ×RSB+ ×RS+J+ is the vector of all of investors’ decisions.
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Bh(η) = {σh ∈ Σh(η) : (1h) − (7h) below} is the budget set where 4(i) represents the
diﬀerence between RHS and LHS of inequality (i).
For t = 0,
X
j∈J
bhj +
X
b∈B
ψhb +
X
l∈L
bh0l +
X
b∈B
dhb ≤
Ã
µh
b
1 + rb
!
+
X
j∈J
θjqhj +mh0 (1h)
(i.e. expenditures for assets, banks’ equity in the primary market, and commodities +
bank deposits ≤ borrowed money at the credit markets + receipts from sales of assets + initial
private monetary endowments)
qh0l ≤ eh0l, ∀l ∈ L (2h)
(i.e. sales of commodities ≤ endowments of commodities)
χh0l ≤ eh0l − qh0l +
bh0l
p0l
, ∀l ∈ L (3h)
(i.e. consumption ≤ initial endowment - sales + purchases)
∀s ∈ S, X
l∈L
bhsl +
X
b∈B
bhsb ≤ 4(1h) +
X
l∈L
p0lq
h
0l +
X
b∈B
shsbθbsV b +mhs (4h)
(i.e. expenditures for commodities and banks’ equity in the secondary market ≤ money
at hand + receipts from sales of commodities + receipts from sales of banks’ equity in the
secondary market + initial private monetary endowment in states s)
X
j∈J
(vhsjpsA
j
s)q
h
j +
X
b∈B
vhsbµ
hb ≤ 4(4h) +
X
l∈L
pslqsl +
X
b∈B
(
bhsb
θbsV bs
+ shb − shsb)πbs
+
X
b∈B
R
b
sdd
h
b (1 + r
b
d) +
X
j∈J
(RsjpsA
j
s)
Ã
bhj
θj
!
(5h)
(i.e. asset and loan deliveries ≤ money at hand + receipts from commodities sales +
distribution of commercial banks’ profits + deposit and interest payment + asset deliveries)
qhsl ≤ ehsl, ∀l ∈ L,∀s ∈ S (6h)
(i.e. sales of commodities ≤ endowments of commodities)
χhsl ≤ ehsl − qhsl +
bhsl
psl
, ∀l ∈ L,∀s ∈ S (7h)
(i.e. consumption ≤ initial endowment - sales + purchases)
15
3.2 Commercial banks
Denote the choices of commercial banks b ∈ B,σb ∈ Σb(η) where σb = (µb, db,mb, µbd, bb, qb, vb,πb) ∈
R+ ×R+ ×R+ ×R+ ×RJ+ ×RJ+ ×RJ+2+ ×RS
∗
+ is the vector of all of their choices.
Bb(η) = {σb ∈ Σb(η) : (1b) − (3b) below} is the budget set where 4(i) represents the
diﬀerence between RHS and LHS of inequality (i).
For t = 0,
db ≤
X
h∈H
ψhb + eb0 (1b)
(i.e. deposits in the interbank market ≤ receipts from banks’ primary equity market +
initial capital endowment)
mb +
X
j∈J
bbj ≤ 4(1b) +
µb
(1 + ρ)
+
X
j∈J
θjqbj +
X
h∈H
dhb (2
b)
(i.e. credit extension + expenditures for assets ≤ money at hand + interbank loans +
receipts from asset sales + consumer deposits)
∀s ∈ S,
X
h∈H
vbs(1+r
b
d)d
h
b+evbsµb+X
j∈J
vbsjpsA
j
jq
b
j ≤4(2b)+
X
h∈H
Rsµ
hb+
X
j∈J
(RsjpsA
j
s)(
bbj
θj
)+Rdsd
b(1+ρ)Ψ+ebs
(3b)
(i.e. deposits and interest repayment + interbank loan repayment + expenditures for
asset deliveries ≤ money at hand + loan repayments + money received from asset payoﬀs +
interbank deposits and interest repayment + initial capital endowment in state s)
where
Ψ = db/(
P
b∈B
db +MCB)
πb0 ≡ 4(2b) and πbs ≡ 4(3b)
Note that since the interbank market is perfectly competitive, in cases where there has been
default, deposit repayments are made proportional to the deposits made by each commercial
bank relative to the aggregate supply of credit by the entire commercial banking sector and
the Central Bank.
3.3 A Remark on Cash-In-Advance
A common criticism of the cash-in-advance (C-I-A)9 models is that these constraints are ad
hoc and do not adequately capture liquidity. Our view is that C-I-A constraints are the
simplest form of liquidity constraints and can be straightforwardly generalised to model more
complicated liquidity constraints. The main intuition of these constraints is that the diﬀerent
instruments and commodities of the economy are not equally liquid. Put diﬀerently, not all
receipts from sales can be contemporaneously used for other purchases. As long as there exist
some liquidity parameters for the commodity endowment which are less than 1 (otherwise, the
9C-I-A constraint can be traced back at least in Clower (1967).
16
budget constraints collapse to the standard Arrow-Debreu constraints), money (or liquidity
or credit) demand is positive in order to bridge the gap between expenditures and receipts.
Indeed, Grandmont and Younes (1972) have used these liquidity parameters. However, the
pure C-I-A constraint oﬀers accounting clarity and ease of exposition. (see section 7)
4 Equilibrium
We say that10 (η, (σh)h∈H , (σb)b∈B) is a Monetary Equilibrium with Commercial Banks and
Default (MECBD) for the economy
E{(uh, eh,mh)h∈H ; (ub, eb)b∈B;A,MCB, µCB,mCB, k,λ,ω}
iﬀ:
(i) psl =
P
h∈H
bhslP
h∈H
qhsl
, ∀s ∈ S∗, l ∈ L;
Condition (i) shows that all commodity markets clear (or equivalently that price expecta-
tions are rational).
(ii) 1 + ρ =
P
b∈B
µb + µCBP
b∈B
db +MCB
Condition (ii) shows that the interbank credit market clears (or equivalently that interbank
interest rate forecasts are rational).
(iii) 1 + rb =
P
hb∈Hb
µh
b
mb
, ∀b ∈ B, hb ∈ Hb;
Condition (iii) shows that the long-term credit markets clear (or equivalently that prediction
of the long-term interest rate is rational).
(iv) 1 + rbd =
µbdP
h∈H
dhb
, ∀b ∈ B, h ∈ H;
Condition (iv) shows that the deposit markets for each bank clear (or equivalently that
prediction of the deposit rates is rational).
(v) θj =
P
h∈H
bhj +
P
b∈B
bbjP
h∈H
qhj +
P
b∈B
qbj
, ∀j ∈ J
Condition (v) shows that every asset market clears (or equivalently, asset price expectations
are rational).
(vi)
P
h∈H
shb = 1, ∀b ∈ B;
Condition (vi) shows that the primary equity market for the bank ownership clears (or
equivalently bank equity shareholding expectation are rational).
10Recall that by assumption p, ρ, rb, θ, R are diﬀerent from 0 and ∞ in each component.
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(vii) θbs =
P
h∈H
bhsbP
h∈H
shsbV
b
, ∀b ∈ B, s ∈ S;
Condition (vii) shows that the secondary equity market of commercial banks clears (or
equivalently secondary market bank equity price expectations are rational.)
(viii) Rsj =



P
h∈H∪B
³
vhsjpsq
h
jA
j
´
P
h∈H∪B
³
pjqhjA
j
´ , if P
h∈H∪B
³
pjq
h
jA
j
´
> 0
arbitrary, if
P
h∈H∪B
³
pjq
h
jA
j
´
= 0



Condition (viii) shows that each asset buyer is correct in his expectations about the fraction
of assets that will be delivered to him.
(ix)-(xii) Rs(Rsd, eRsd, eRs) =



P
h∈H∪B
³
vsµ
hb(dh
b
(1 + rb), db(1 + ρ), µb)
´
P
h∈H∪B
¡
µhb(dhb(1 + rb), db(1 + ρ), µb)
¢ ,
if
P
h∈H∪B
³
µh
b
(dh
b
(1 + rb), db(1 + ρ), µb)
´
> 0,∀s ∈ S
arbitrary, if
P
h∈H∪B
³
µh
b
(dh
b
(1 + rb), db(1 + ρ), µb)
´
= 0



Conditions (ix)-(xii) show that the Central Bank and commercial banks are correct in their
expectations about the fraction of loans that will be delivered to them. Similarly, investors and
commercial banks are correct in their expectations about the fraction of deposits and interest
rate payment that will be delivered to them.
(xiii) (a) σh ∈ Argmax
σh∈Bh(η)
Πh(χh)
(b) σb ∈ Argmax
σb∈Bb(η)
Πb(πb)
Condition (xii) shows that all agents optimise.
In sum, all markets clear and agents optimise given their budget sets. These are the defining
properties of a competitive equilibrium.
5 Orderly Functioning of Markets: Existence of a Monetary
Equilibrium with Commercial Banks and Default
If a MECBD exists, then default and financial instability manifest themselves as equilibrium
phenomena entirely consistent with the proper-functioning of markets. Thus, if any of these
phenomena are deemed detrimental for the economy and for the welfare of the society, then
regulatory intervention may be justified. Moreover, active crisis management and prevention
can become necessary.
As can be seen from conditions (viii)-(xii) of section 4, expected deliveries of assets, loans
and deposits are equal to realised deliveries in equilibrium. However, the specification of
expectations for inactive markets is ‘arbitrary’. Thus, we need a hypothesis to rule out trivial
equilibrium (in which trade in the corresponding markets collapses). Following Tsomocos
(2003a) we impose the Inactive Market Hypothesis.
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Inactive Market Hypothesis (IMH): Whenever credit or asset markets are inactive
the corresponding rates of delivery are set equal to 1.
This hypothesis follows closely Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2000), and Dubey and
Shubik (1978) that allow an external agent to be added in these markets that always supplies
an ε amount and never abrogates his contractual obligations. It may be thought as the FDIC
or an analogous institution.
Economic agents in our model are not required to trade and they always have the option to
consume their own endowment. This situation arises when interest rates are prohibitively high
and thus there is no demand for credit. Then, it also becomes uncertain whether the interbank
market will be active as well. This happens whenever the marginal cost of borrowing (i.e.
interest rate payments) is higher than the marginal benefit of the extra consumption.
We are thus naturally led to adopt a condition that guarantees suﬃcient gains from trade.
For an extensive discussion on this issue see Dubey and Geanakoplos (1992), (2003a). Geanako-
plos and Tsomocos (2002) extend the gains from trade condition to a model related to the
present one. The crucial insight of this condition is that, even if transaction costs are high,
utility from extra consumption would still make such transaction attractive. We use the defi-
nition of gains from trade from Tsomocos (2003a) which is given as follows:
Definition:
Let (χh,πb) ∈ RS
∗×(L+1)
+ ∀h ∈ H, b ∈ B. ∀δ > 0, we will say that (χ1, ...,χh;π1, ...,πb) ∈
(RS
∗×L
+ )
H×RS∗×B+ permits at least δ−gains-from-trades τ1, ..., τH ; τ1, ..., τB in RL+1 such that
1.
P
h∈H
τh +
P
b∈B
τ b = 0
2. (a) χhs + τh ∈ RL+, ∀h ∈ H
(b) πbs + τh ∈ R, ∀b ∈ B
3. (a) uh(χh) > uh(χh), ∀h ∈ H
(b) ub(πb) > ub(πb), ∀b ∈ B
where,
χhtl =
½
χhtl, t ∈ S∗\{s}
χhtl +min{τhl , τhl /(1 + δ)} for l ∈ L and t = s
¾
πbt =
½
πbt , t ∈ S∗\{s}
πbt +min{τ b, τ b/(1 + δ)} for t = s
¾
Note that when δ > 0, χhl < χhl + τhl , if τhl > 0 and χhtl = χhtl + τhl if τhl ≤ 0. Also,
πbt < πbt + τ b, if τ b > 0 and πbt = πbt + τ b, if τ b ≤ 0
Formally, the hypothesis that we impose on the economy for suﬃcient gains from trades is:
G from T:
∀s ∈ S, the initial endowment (eh, eb)h∈H∪B permits at least δs−gains to trade in state s,
where
δs =
P
h∈H
mh0 +
P
h∈H
mhs +
P
b∈B
eb0 +
P
b∈B
ebs
MCB
We are now ready to state the existence theorem that establishes default and financial
fragility compatible with equilibrium and the orderly functioning of markets. Note that the
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existence theorem also resolves the ‘Hahn paradox’ (1965) whereby money has no-value in
finite horizon.
Theorem:
If in the economy E = {(uh, eh,mh)h∈H ; (ub, eb)b∈B;A,MCB, µCB,mCB,λ,ω}
1. G from T and IMH hold,
2. MCB > 0,
3. ∀s ∈ S∗,
P
h∈H
mhs +
P
b∈B
ebs > 0 and
4. λ >> 0,∀h ∈ H, b ∈ B
then a MECBD exists.11
6 Financial Fragility, Default and the Liquidity Trap
6.1 Financial Fragility and Contagion: Concepts and Definitions
We adopt a definition of financial fragility introduced in Tsomocos (2003a), where a MECBD is
financially fragile whenever a substantial ‘number’ of households and commercial banks default
on some of their obligations (i.e. a liquidity ‘crisis’), without necessarily becoming bankrupt,
and the aggregate profitability of the banking sector decreases significantly (i.e. a banking
‘crisis’).
The formal definition of financial fragility is as follows;
Definition: A MECBD (η, (σh)h∈H , (σb)b∈B) is financially fragile at s whenever Dh
∗
sz ,
Db
∗
sz ≥ D,
P
b∈B
πbs ≤ Π, for |H∗| + |B∗| ≥ Z, and s ∈ S∗ where Z ∈ (0, |H| + |B|) and
Π,D ∈ R++.
This definition requires both increased default and reduced aggregate profitability. In-
creased default by itself might indicate excessive risk taking without necessarily engendering
a serious strain on the financial sector of the economy, whereas a decrease in profitability by
itself might indicate the onset of a recession in the real economy and not of financial vulner-
ability. Also, with heterogenous agents, the welfare of society depends not only on aggregate
outcomes, but also on their distribution over agents.
The interaction of investors and commercial banks in the various markets of this model
allows us to precisely trace the diﬀerent channels of contagion given an adverse shock. The
first channel of contagion is the one generated by increased default in a specific sector of
the economy. For example, if a specific bank charges exobitantly high interest rates on its
clients then their subsequent default impacts upon the rest of the economy. Commercial banks
reduce their repayment rates in the interbank market and investors and/or commercial banks
abrogate their obligation in the asset markets. Alternatively, the commodity markets may be
aﬀected either through reduced supply (or demand) which in turn aﬀects expected income of
the household sector (or the supplier). The upshot of this chain of contagion is that reduced
liquidity hurts the lenders whose income (or equivalently their expenditures) is reduced, thus
decreasing their consumption and welfare. We note that this chain may be broken, for example,
with emergency liquidity assistance that neutralises the reduced loan repayment rate to the
11For an extensive discussion of the theorem in such a model see Tsomocos (2003a). See also the proof
of theorem in the appendix where the modification from the arguments of Tsomocos (2003a and 2003b) is
presented.
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initial commercial bank. The same reasoning applies for contagion through the interbank
market’s increased default.
Second, contagion may commence through the collapse of the banking sector’s equity value
in the secondary market. Since the distribution of profits to investors is determined by the
shares of ownership as they are specified in the secondary banks’ equity market, weakness
of the banking sector is translated to investors’ income. Reduced expected profitability of
the banking sector will be reflected in a reduced value of the shares of ownership of banks’
equity and thus the reduced income will lower such agents’ repayment rates of loans and asset
deliveries. For example, if bank b’s equity drops in value then its investors will increase their
default in the rest of the economy which will adversely aﬀect other agents’ welfare as well,
who transact with them in the asset market. Finally, the last channel of contagion which will
be discussed in section 6.2 is generated by a possible ineﬀectiveness of monetary policy. As
monetary policy eases without aﬀecting the real side of the economy (i.e. we enter a liquidity
trap), the extra liquidity inflates activity in some asset markets. This in turn leads commercial
banks to violate excessively their capital requirements which adversely aﬀects their profitability
and subsequently their equity value. Through the investor sector’s ownership of bank shares
contagion spreads outside the banking sector and may reduce welfare in the rest of the economy.
Finally, due to limited liability and active default in equilibrium, the Modigliani-Miller
irrelevance proposition does not hold in our model for the commercial banking sector. Equity
is default free, whereas debt (either through interbank or credit market loans) is defaultable.
6.2 Liquidity Trap
The Keynesian liquidity trap describes a situation in which monetary policy would not aﬀect
real expenditures in the economy. If interest rates are suﬃciently low and investors expect them
to rise in the future, then they do not invest into assets like bonds whose value is expected
to fall. Thus, they hold the extra money balances due to expansionary monetary policy for
speculative purposes without aﬀecting commodity prices. Various authors provide models that
allow for the occurrence of a liquidity trap (e.g. Tobin (1963, 1982), Grandmont and Laroque
(1973), and Hool (1976)).
Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003) provide a novel interpretation of this phenomenon. They
argue that in a monetary GEI model, as monetary policy eases, then commodity prices remain
unaﬀected whereas the extra liquidity is channeled into asset market(s) where trading activity
becomes large. However, in the aggregate there is almost no new net trading activity in such
asset markets. This possibility is non-generic, and occurs only in an equilibrium where the
corresponding real GEI economy possesses no equilibrium (i.e. the case of the Hart (1975)
counterexample).
In the present model, the same phenomenon reappears, (coupled with financial instability),
only when capital requirements are non-binding. Otherwise, such increased trading activity
would lead commercial banks to increase their risk-weighted assets and thus violate their capital
requirements even more so. Moreover, the liquidity trap originates from the interbank market
and may propagate to the asset markets via investments of the banks only. However, note
that this is a non-generic case and occurs only when equilibrium fails to exist in the underlying
real GEI economy. Of course, the assets most commonly bought by commercial banks in a
liquidity trap are government bonds, and these usually bear a zero risk-weight. This analysis
therefore provides a rationale for imposing some positive risk-weighting on these assets as well.
However, when capital requirements are binding, the liquidity trap may still be present
via excessive trading activity in equity markets. Banks now switch to credit extension and
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consumers spend in the primary bank equity market (thus helping to satisfy the capital re-
quirements of banks). Alternatively, in anticipation of a higher liquidation value of commercial
banks, consumers restructure their portfolio of banks’ equity in the secondary market. The
next proposition summarises this intuition.
Proposition 1
Suppose that the economy has a riskless asset Ajsm = (1, ..., 1) (i.e. monetary payoﬀs in
every state are equal to one) and Ajsl = 0,∀s ∈ S and l ∈ L for kbt = 0. Also, consider the case
in which the underlying economy has no GEI. Then as MCB →∞, then
(i) ω(η, δ)Rbsmb(1 + rb) +
P
j∈J
ωij(η, δ)Rsj(psAjs)
µ
bbj
θj
¶
+ ω(η, δ)Rbsdb → ∞,∀s ∈ S∗, from
some b ∈ B, M
CB
kp0lk →∞ and (
P
h∈H
qhj +
P
b∈B
qbj)→∞.
(ii) There exists D,Π such that Dh
∗
sz ,D
b∗
sz > D > 0 for some b
∗ ∈ B,h∗ ∈ H, and
P
b∈B
πbs ≤ Π.
(iii) Suppose now that λbkt = +∞,∀b ∈ B and k
b
t > 0. Then,
MCB
kp0lk → ∞ and (
P
h∈H
qhj +P
b∈B
qbj) < K, for some K ∈ (0,+∞), but
P
h∈H
shsbV
b →∞.
6.3 Regulatory Policy and Default
Since both default and capital requirements’ violations incur a cost, consumers and banks
weigh the marginal costs and benefits of abrogating their contractual or regulatory obligation.
Thus, for suﬃciently high penalties, default and capital requirements’ violations vanish in
equilibrium. We therefore observe the importance of capital requirements for financial stability.
For example, whenever credit is fully collateralised, the regulator guarantees future financial
stability. This, however, has an opportunity cost since the resulting higher interest rates due
to stricter capital requirements would reduce eﬃcient trade.
In sum, we note that at least one aspect of the well-known trade-oﬀ between financial
stability and eﬃciency is present and this indicates the interconnectedness of monetary and
regulatory policies.
Proposition 2
There exist λbkt and λ
h
sz, λ
b
sz such that D
h
sz = D
b
sz = 0 and kt − kbt = 0, ∀b ∈ B, h ∈ H
Since agents may opt to default or violate their capital requirements in equilibrium, changes
in regulatory practice aﬀect their marginal rates of substitution among various choices and thus
produce equilibria with diﬀerent allocations, as the following proposition indicates. The model
is liquidity based with well-defined transaction technology and settlement processes; therefore
both real changes as well as changes of the nominal constraints have a necessarily non-neutral
eﬀect.
We define a MECBD to be bank-indecomposable if for any s ∈ S∗ and any partition of
assets into disjoint sets Γ1 and Γ2 there is some b ∈ B who transacts in at least one asset from
each set in s ∈ S∗.
Proposition 3
Suppose that uh, ub are diﬀerentiable and mhs , e
b
s > 0 or λb < λ
b
sz and λh < λ
h
sz and k
b
t > 0
for all h ∈ H, b ∈ B and s ∈ S∗. Then at a bank-indecomposable MECBD any change by the
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regulator of λ, k or ω results in a diﬀerent MECBD in which for some b ∈ B the payoﬀ is
diﬀerent.
6.4 Modigliani-Miller Proposition
The modeling of commercial banks that have diverse financing and investment opportunities
sheds light on the Modigliani-Miller proposition. The traditional argument for the validity of
the irrelevance of financing rests on perfect and frictionless capital markets. Various arguments
such as limited liability, bankruptcy costs and diﬀerential taxation between debt and equity
have been oﬀered to invalidate this proposition.
In the present model, only when (i) markets are complete, (ii) limited participation does
not produce diﬀerent borrowing behaviour, and (iii) banks’ risk taking behaviour, and capital
requirements are identical, then financing does not matter. Put diﬀerently, only when we
remove all the frictions of the model and also impose homogeneity across banks, do we recover
the Modigliani-Miller proposition. When one models active banks with diversified portfolios,
not only lack of frictions but also identical investment guarantees the validity of the irrelevance
proposition.
As our next proposition shows, any deviation from these principles destroys the symmetry
of debt-equity financing. First, limited participation, even for banks with identical financing,
creates diﬀerent returns from credit extension, and thus changes the value of banks in t = 1.
Second, even if all other variables remain the same across banks, diﬀerent risk-appetites lead
them to form diﬀerent portfolios. Given diﬀerential returns amongst the various investments
(i.e. credit extension, investment in the interbank and asset markets), banks’ preferences
towards risk generate diﬀerent terminal values for banks’ portfolios12 Third, diﬀerent capital
requirements and/or risk-weights provide diﬀerent incentives to banks when forming their
portfolios provided that the capital requirements’ violation penalties are transferable to banks’
shareholders. Otherwise, it may very well be the case that the penalty is internalised by banks
management who still form identical portfolios and thus generate equal profits. Thus, the
forces of demand and supply will typically equilibrate the markets so that banks’ equity will
trade at diﬀerent prices in the secondary equity market. This may be relevant for analysing
the impact of the New Basel Accord.
Finally, even in the absence of the previous frictions but with incomplete markets, i.e.
|J | < |S|, diﬀerent financing alters the space of marketed assets and therefore produces diﬀerent
equilibria and consequently diﬀerent values for banks. In other words, this is akin to the
distinction of comparing within an equilibrium two diﬀerent financing structures that produce
identical payoﬀs and across diﬀerent equilibria of a bank that changes its financing. In the first
instance, value is not aﬀected, whereas in the second it is. If two diﬀerent financing schemes
have the same payoﬀs, in an equilibrium, then the corresponding values of the banks will be
the same by a standard no-arbitrage argument. However, if one bank changes its financing
then the monetary payoﬀs of its assets in the new equilibrium will typically be diﬀerent,
given incomplete markets and limited liability. This distinction holds only when markets are
incomplete; otherwise since the space of marketed assets does not change, the two cases are
equivalent.
12This point has also been discussed extensively by King (1977).
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Proposition 4
Let b1, b2 ∈ B with µb1 = µb2 and
P
h∈H
ψhb1 =
P
h∈H
ψhb2 .Moreover, suppose λ
b1
kt = λ
b2
kt ,λ
b1
sz = λb2sz
and eb1s = e
b2
s , ∀s ∈ S∗ (i.e., identical financing, default and initial capital endowments)
(i) Limited participation: If ub1 = ub2 but ∃h ∈ H1 and bh ∈ H2, h 6= bh with respect to
their endowments or preferences such that either ψbhb1 ,ψbhb2 > 0 or bbhsb1 , sbhsb1 and bbhsb2 , sbhsb2 > 0,
then θb1s 6= θb2s for some s ∈ S.
(ii) Risk Preferences: If h = bh for all h ∈ H1 and bh ∈ H2 with respect to their endowments
and preferences but ub1 6= ub2 then θb1s 6= θb2s .
(iii) Regulation: Let either [0, kt − kb1t ]+ and/or [0, kt − kb2t ]+ > 0 but [0, kt − kb1t ]+ 6=
[0, kt−kb2t ]+. Also, let
λbkt [0,kt−k
b
t ]
+
psgs
be transferable to banks’ shareholders. If both ub1 = ub2 , h =bh ∀h ∈ H1 and bh ∈ H2 but either kb1t 6= kb2t or ωb1tj 6= ωb2tj for some j ∈ J or t ∈ T then θb1s 6= θb2s .
(iv) Incomplete markets: Suppose |J | < |S| , ub1 = ub2 , h = bh ∀h ∈ H1 and bh ∈ H2,
kb1t = k
b2
t or ω
b1
tj = ω
b2
tj , ∀j ∈ J and limited liability. Now let bµb1 6= µb2 but P
h∈H1
ψˆhb1 + bµb1 =P
h∈H1
ψhb2 + µ
b2 . Then θb1s 6= θb2s for some s ∈ S in the new MECBD.
(v) Complete markets: If |J | = |S| , ub1 = ub2 , h = bh ∀h ∈ H1 and bh ∈ H2, kb1t = kb2t or
ωb1tj = ω
b2
tj then θ
b1
s = θb2s .
In sum, the Modigliani-Miller principle is violated primarily from two sources. First, when
structural frictions such as limited participation and market incompleteness are present. Sec-
ond, when investment behaviour of active banks is aﬀected by diﬀerent incentives or diﬀerent
attitudes towards risk.
7 Money Demand, Interest Rates, and the Non-Neutrality of
Monetary Policy
The monetary/financial sector of our simple specification of the economy, coupled with its
transaction technology, produces the traditional motives for holding money. Thus, we observe
that the standard Hicksian determinants of money demand are present in the model.
In particular, liquidity provision by banks and default by both banks and households pro-
duce an intricate relationship among interest rates. Since base money is fiat and the horizon is
finite13, in the end money exits the system. This means that both central bank money, MCB
(i.e. inside money) and money and liquidity present in the initial endowments of banks and
households (i.e. outside money) would exit the system either via loan repayments to commer-
cial banks or to the Central Bank by the commercial banks. Thus, the overall liquidity of the
economy aﬀects the determination of interest rates. Moreover, endogenous default is possible
in equilibrium and inevitably aﬀects interest rates as well. In sum, both a liquidity and default
premium aﬀects interest rates. However, further structural assumptions are needed to be able
to disentangle these term premia.
13Had we used an infinite horizon model, as long as there is settlement and liquidation in regular time intervals,
similar results would hold.
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Liquidity Structure of Interest Rates Proposition:
In any MECBD, ∀s ∈ SX
b∈B
mbrb =
X
h∈H
(mh0 +m
h
s )(
1
vhsb
) +
X
b∈B
(eb0 + e
b
s)(
1
v¯bs
)
In our multi-period setting, if |B| > |S|+1 then there are more interest rates than equations.
Thus, they depend on the real data of the economy and are subject to policy intervention. The
only exception is when mhs = e
b
s = 0,∀s ∈ S∗, h ∈ H, b ∈ B and vhsb = vbs = 1,∀s ∈ S∗, h ∈
H, b ∈ B. In such a case, all interest rates are zero (including ρ) and money is essentially a
veil.
If all interest rates are positive, then all the available liquidity will be channeled in the
commodity markets ∀s ∈ S. However, this is not the case at s = 0 because of uncertainty
and incomplete markets, investors may opt to spend it in the asset markets or hold some
precautionary reserves.
Quantity Theory of Money Proposition:
In any MECBD with ρ > 0,X
h∈H
X
l∈L
pslq
h
sl =
X
b∈B
mb +
X
h∈HUB
X
j∈J
vhsjpsq
h
jA
j +
X
h∈H
X
b∈B
shbsθbsV b +∆(1h)
∀s ∈ S.
For s = 0,X
h∈H
X
l∈L
p0lq
h
0l =M
CB +
X
b∈B
db −
X
h∈HUB
bhj −
X
h∈H
X
b∈B
ψhb −∆(1h)−
X
b∈B
πb0
This is no ‘crude’ quantity theory of money. Velocity will always be less than or equal
to 1 (one if all interest rates are positive). However, since quantities supplied in the markets
are chosen by agents (unlike the representative agent model’s sell-all assumption), the real
velocity of money, that is how many real transactions can be moved by money per unit time,
is endogenous.
The interest rates determined in equilibrium are in nominal terms. Thus, they depend not
only on the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, but also on the inflation rate of the
economy. So, the well known Fisher relation holds, as is argued in the next proposition.
Fisher Eﬀect Proposition:
Suppose that for some h ∈ Hb, bh0l and bhsl > 0 for l ∈ L and s ∈ S. Suppose further that
∆(4h) > 0. Then in a MECBD,
(1 + rb) =
µµ
∂uh(χ)
∂χ0l
¶
/
µ
∂uh(χ)
∂χsl
¶¶µ
psl
p0l
¶
Taking the logarithm of both sides and interpreting loosely, this says that the nominal rate
of interest is equal to the real rate of interest plus the (expected) rate of inflation.
As in the case with regulatory policy, monetary policy also has non-neutral eﬀects. As it
is proved in Tsomocos (2001), MECBD are finite with respect to both real allocations and
nominal variables. Thus, any monetary change (except the one mentioned in the remark after
proposition 5) aﬀects interest rates and therefore economic agents’ decisions. Finally, since
25
MECBD are typically constrained ineﬃcient, policy changes do not necessarily aﬀect welfare
and financial stability monotonically.
We define a MECBD to be investors-indecomposable if for any s ∈ S∗ any partition of goods
into disjoint sets L1 and L2 there is some h ∈ H who transacts in at least one commodity from
each set in s ∈ S∗.
Proposition 5
Suppose that all uh, ub are diﬀerentiable and mhs , e
b
s > 0 or λb < λ
b
and λh < λh for all
h ∈ H, b ∈ B and s ∈ S∗. Suppose at an indecomposable MECBD at every s ∈ S∗ all h ∈ H
consume positive amounts of all goods l ∈ L and that some h ∈ H carries over money from
period 0 to 1. Then any change by the Central Bank (except the one described in the remark)
results in a diﬀerent MECBD in which for some h ∈ H consumption is diﬀerent.
Remark: The ‘no money illusion’ property holds in the model. A proportional increase of
all the nominal endowments of the consumers and commercial banks while k stays fixed and
penalties are scaled down proportionally does not aﬀect the real variables of MECBD.
8 Application
In this section we specialise the general model presented earlier to the case of three households
and two banks, where the time horizon extends over two periods (t ∈ {0, 1}) and three possible
states (s ∈ {1, 2, 3}) in the first period. One bank, bank γ, is relatively poor at t = 0
and therefore has to seek external funds to finance its loans to its nature-selected borrower,
Mr. α. Bank γ can raise its funds either by borrowing from the interbank or the deposit
markets. Bank γ’s assets comprise only of its credit extension to the consumer loan market.
This way we can focus on the eﬀects of policies on banks that cannot quickly restructure
their portfolios, perhaps due to inaccessibility of capital and asset markets, during periods of
financial adversity. The other bank, bank δ, is a relatively rich commercial bank. In addition
to its lending activities to its nature-selected borrower, Mr. β, its portfolio consists of deposits
in the interbank market. Bank δ which is relatively richer compared to bank γ, has also
alternative investment opportunities such as depositing in the interbank market. Its richer
portfolio allows it to diversify quickly and more eﬃciently than bank γ. Mr. α and Mr. β are
poor in terms of their commodity endowment at t = 0, and therefore have to borrow money
from banks γ and δ, respectively, to buy commodities. As they are rich at t = 1, they sell
commodities in the three states of period 1. On the other hand, Mr. φ is rich in t = 0 and
poor in t = 1 (both in terms of commodity and monetary endowments).
We allow endogenous defaults in the interbank market, i.e. bank γ can default on its
interbank loans in which it borrows from bank δ. Furthermore, Mr. φ has a choice to deposit
his money with either bank. To distinguish between bank γ’s and bank δ’s deposits, we assume
that the relatively more risky bank, bank γ, can default on its borrowing from the deposit
market. Finally, we assume that the cost of default in the interbank and deposit market is
quadratic. This in turn implies that the marginal cost of default in these markets increases as
the size of borrowing becomes larger.
Formally, the agents’ utility/profit functions can be described as follows;
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Uα = [χα0 − cα0 (χα0 )2] +
3X
s=1
[χαs − cαs (χαs )2]−
3X
s=1
λαsγ max[0, µα
γ − vαsγµα
γ
]
Uβ = [χβ0 − c
β
0 (χ
β
0 )
2] +
3X
s=1
[χβs − cβs (χβs )2]−
3X
s=1
λβsδmax[0, µ
βδ − vαsδµβ
δ
]
Uφ = [χφ0 − c
φ
0(χ
φ
0 )
2] +
3X
s=1
[χφs − cφs (χφs )2]
Uγ =
3X
s=1
πγs −
3X
s=1
³
λγksmax[0, k − k
γ
s ] + λγs [µγ − vγsµγ ]2 + λ
γ
sφ[µ
γ
d − v
γ
sµ
γ
d ]
2
´
U δ =
3X
s=1
πδs −
3X
s=1
λδksmax[0, k − kδs]
Given the chosen set of exogenous parameters/variables, we solve the agents’ optimisation
problems using a version of Newton’s method and obtain the initial MECBD equilibrium. We
then conduct a series of comparative statics by perturbing each of the exogenous parame-
ters/variables. However, as the purpose of this section is merely to illustrate how the general
model developed in this paper can be applied to analyse the issue of financial fragility in prac-
tice, we only report the result of one comparative statics below. The fully-analysed application
of the general model which also involves a variation of specialisation of the general model can
be found in the companion papers, Goodhart et al. (2003). Moreover, the full description of
the agents’ optimisation problems, the chosen value of exogenous parameters and the initial
equilibrium used in this section can be found op. cit.
8.1 Expansionary Monetary Policy
Let the Central Bank engage in expansionary monetary policy by increasing the money supply
in the interbank market (or equivalently lowering the interbank market rate). Due to the
lower cost of funds in the interbank market, bank γ extends more credit to Mr. α and thus its
lending rate decreases. Also, it restructures its liability side by reducing its deposit demand,
thus lowering rγd . In turn, Mr. φ increases his deposits with bank δ whose deposit rate now
also falls. Consequently, bank δ expands its credit extension and deposits in the interbank
market.
Given more liquidity in the economy, by the quantity theory of money proposition, all prices
increase. So, the expected income of Mr. α and β increases and so do their repayment rates.
This could also have been predicted by the liquidity structure of interest rate proposition since
expansionary monetary policy has increased liquidity.
With respect to the welfare eﬀects of expansionary monetary policy, as expected, the house-
hold sector benefits from lower borrowing cost. However, lower deposit rates adversely aﬀect
Mr. φ whose welfare decreases. Finally, banks’ profits are lower since the higher repayment
rates are compensated by the capital requirements’ violation penalties they incur since their
risk-weighted assets increase. Capital requirements worsen because the eﬀect of higher credit
extension and higher repayment rates dominate the beneficial eﬀect of lower lending rates.
In sum, monetary policy has ambiguous welfare and profit eﬀects depending on the state of
the economic cycle. While the impact on borrowers is typically positive, the eﬀect on investors
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and financial intermediaries depends on their portfolio and the regulatory regimes in which
they operate.
8.2 Conclusion
In Goodhart et. al (2003), we explain in detail other relevant experiments, e.g. a change in
household commodity and monetary endowment, a change in risk weight on loans etc. However,
in this subsection we highlight some of the main lessons that can be drawn from them. First,
in an adverse economic environment, expansionary monetary policy can aggravate financial
fragility since the extra liquidity injected by the Central Bank may be used by certain banks
to gamble for resurrection, worsening their capital position, and therefore the overall financial
stability of the economy. Thus, a trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and financial stability need not
exist only for regulatory policies, but also for monetary policy.
Second, agents which have more investment opportunities can deal with negative shocks
more eﬀectively by using their flexibility in quickly restructuring their investment portfolios
as a means of transferring ‘negative externalities’ to other agents with a more restricted set of
investment opportunities. This result has various implications. Among others, banks which
have no well-diversified portfolios tend to follow a countercyclical credit extension policy in
face of a negative regulatory shock in the loan market (e.g. tighter loan risk weights). In
contrast, banks which can quickly restructure their portfolio tend to reallocate their portfolio
away from the loan market, thus following a procyclical credit extension policy. Moreover,
regulatory policies which are selectively targeted at diﬀerent groups of banks can produce
very non-symmetric results. When the policy is aimed at banks which have more investment
opportunities, much less contagion eﬀect to the rest of the economy is observed since those
banks simply restructure their portfolios between interbank and asset markets without greatly
perturbing the credit market, and therefore interest rates and prices in the economy. On the
contrary, when the same policy is targeted at banks which have relatively limited investment
opportunities, they are forced to ‘bite the bullet’ by altering their credit extension. This
produces changes in a series of interest rates, and therefore the cost of borrowing for agents.
This in turn produces a contagion eﬀect to the real sector in the economy.
Thirdly, an improvement such as a positive productivity shock, which is concentrated in
one part of the economy, can worsen that for others. The key reason for this lies in the fact that
our model has heterogenous agents and distributional eﬀects therefore operate through various
feedback channels among various sectors in the economy which all are active in equilibrium.
Finally, increasing the endowment of banks produces much the same result as increasing
their corresponding capital violation penalties, particularly in regards to its contagion eﬀects
to the rest of the economy. Thus, a direct injection of emergency recapitalisation funds to
banks is, to a certain extent, substitutable by increasing the banks’ capital violation penalties.
9 Concluding Remarks
In reality, the economic system is both complex and heterogenous. In order to model it in a
way that is both mathematically tractable, rigorous, and yet simple enough to be illuminat-
ing, economists have tended to assume homogeneity amongst agents in the sectors involved.
Unfortunately that prevents analysis of certain key features of the real world, especially those
relating to interbank interactions and financial fragility.
We have sought to focus on such inter-active channels. That has inevitably raised the
complexity of our modelling; however we have tried to limit such complexity by adopting an
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endowment economy with just endowed consumers and banks, (no firms, no external sector,
no other financial intermediaries, a black-box oﬃcial sector).
We see this paper as the start of a major programme to use models such as this for the
analysis of financial fragility. We shall stick to two main principles; first, heterogeneity is
essential; second our approach to modelling default is the best available modelling strategy.
Otherwise we hope to examine a wide range of alternative structures.
The main challenges ahead will be, first to represent a complex reality in a manner that
is both illuminating and yet reflects that reality, and second to be able to draw general con-
clusions from an array of models that may, each individually, be sensitive to their individual
particularities. This paper is the first step in our planned programme.
10 Appendix I: Proofs
10.1 Proof of Theorem
The proof follows mutatis mutandis from Tsomocos (2003). we will here provide on the parts
that are diﬀerent.
First, we need to extend the strategy spaces as follows:
Σhε = {(χh, µhb , dhb , bh, qh,ψh, bhsb, shsb, vh) ∈ RLS
∗
+ × R+ × R+ × RLS
∗+J
+ × RLS
∗+J
+ × RB+ ×
RSB+ ×RSB+ ×RS+J+ : 0 ≤ χh ≤ 2A1, εmh0 ≤ µh
b ≤ 1ε , εmh0 ≤ dhb ≤M∗, εmhs ≤ bhsl(bhj ) ≤
1
ε , ε ≤
qhsl(q
h
j ) ≤ 1ε , εmh0 ≤ ψ
h ≤ 1ε , εmhs ≤ bhsb ≤
1
ε , ε ≤ shsb ≤ 1, ε ≤ vh ≤ 1}
and
Σbε = {(µb, db,mb, µbd, bb, qb, vb,πb) ∈ R+×R+×R+×R+×RJ+×RJ+×RJ+2+ ×RS
∗
+ : εeb0 ≤
µb ≤ 1ε , 0 ≤ db ≤M∗, εeb0 ≤ mb ≤
1
ε , εe
b
0 ≤ µbd ≤ 1ε , εeb0 ≤ bbj ≤
1
ε , ε ≤ qbj ≤
1
ε , ε ≤ vbs ≤ 1, εebs ≤
πbs ≤M∗}
which are both compact and convex. Also, M∗ ≡MCB +
P
h∈H
P
s∈S∗
mhs +
P
b∈B
P
s∈S∗
ebs.
We need to bound rbd(ε). rbd(ε) ≥ 0 by Σhε and Σbε. Now let rbd(ε)→∞. Then b could reduce
µh
b
(ε) by 4 and improve its pay oﬀ, since rbd(ε)4→∞, a contradiction.
Furthermore, we need to show that 0 < θbs(ε) < ∞,∀b ∈ B, s ∈ S. First, let θbs(ε) → 0 for
some s ∈ S, b ∈ B. Then choose h ∈ H. He could have borrowed 4 more to buy 4/θbs(ε)→∞
of bank b. He could have then increased his income from the liquidation of b by 4/θbsV bs →∞
and use it to pay back his loan and reduce either his sales qhsl or d
h
sb or increase his repayment
rates vhsj , v
h
sb and thus improve his payoﬀ, a contradiction.
Now let θbs(ε)→∞ for some s ∈ S, b ∈ B. Let hb ∈ H borrow a very large µh
b
and use it to
buy any sl. Then, hb could sell4 of bank b, acquire4θbs(ε)→∞ to defray his loan and therefore
improve his payoﬀ, a contradiction. ¤
10.2 Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Let MCB → ∞ and assume that (
P
h∈H
qhj +
P
b∈B
qbj) 9 ∞. Then by choosing subsequences
and further subsequences select a subsequence along which all relative σ’s and η’s converge.
Thus, the limit of the last subsequence coincides with a GEI, a contradiction. Also by feasi-
bility, MCB/ kθjk→∞ and therefore ω(η,σ)Rbsmb(1 + rb) +
P
j∈J
ωij(η,σ)Rsj(psAjs)
³
bbj/θj
´
+
ω(η,σ)Rbsdb →∞, ∀s ∈ S∗, b ∈ B. Finally, the relative boundedness of η’s (by the proof of the
Theorem 1) yields MCB/ kp0,lk→∞.
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(ii) ∃z 3 ∇Πb∗s (πb∗s ) > λb
∗
s and ∇Πh
∗
s (χh
∗
s ) > λh
∗
s for some b
∗ ∈ B and h∗ ∈ H by Tsomocos
(2003a). Thus, Dh
∗
sz ,D
b∗
sz > D > 0. Interiority of the maximum implies bounded aggregate
profits and consumption.
(iii) Assume now that
P
h∈H
ψhb < +∞. Then again by choosing subsequences and further
subsequences select a subsequence along which all relative σ’s and η’s converge. Again the
limit of this subsequence yields a MECBD that coincides with a GEI, a contradiction. Thus,P
h∈H
ψhb → +∞. Moreover, since kbt > 0 and λbkt = +∞ the argument of (i) does not obtain and
so ∀b ∈ B, mb, µb →∞ thus we get
P
h∈H
shsbV
b
s →∞ by the boundedness of shsb. ¤
10.3 Proof of Proposition 2
From the theorem, psl, θj > c, ∀s ∈ S∗, l ∈ L. Let
Q = 1 +max{[∇Πbs(πbs)/∇Πbs´(πbs´) : s, s
0 ∈ S∗, b ∈ B, πbs ∈ ♦], [∇Πhs (χhs )/∇Πhs´ (χhs´ ) : s, s´ ∈ S∗, h ∈ H
where ♦ = { πbs ∈ IRs+1t : πbs ≤ 1 + max
0≤s≤S
X
b∈B
ebs + max
0≤s≤S
X
h∈H
mhs}
Let bλhsz = (Q/c)max{∇Πhl (χhl ), h ∈ H, l ∈ L, χhl < A} and λsz > bλhsz,bλbsz = (Q/c)max{∇Πbs(πbs), s ∈ S, b ∈ B, πbs ∈ ♦} and λsz > bλbsz, and
λkt = λsz.
Then, if b ∈ B defaults an amount ε on its asset deliveries (or violates its capital require-
ments) its net gain will be at most
(ε∇Πbs(πbs)/θj)− ελbsz
For λbsz = λsz the expression becomes negative. Similarly for capital requirements and
h ∈ H. ¤
10.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Let at the original MECBD bank b buys asset j and sells j
0
. From the existence argument,
θj > c, ∀s ∈ S∗, l ∈ L. Define Jb = {j ∈ J : bbj > 0} and Lb = {j ∈ J : qbj > 0}. Since θj > 0,
∀j ∈ J , and
Pb is bounded below by ε, ∀b ∈ B ∃ b, b0 ∀j ∈ J 3 Jb ∩ Lb0 6= φ (or equivalently
Jb
0
∩Lb 6= φ). Otherwise, all banks would be transacting in the same asset markets rendering
them lopsided. Thus, ∃b, b0 , ∀j ∈ J, involved in reverse transaction. Else, one bank would
either violate its capital requirement excessively or would not satisfy its budget constraint.
From the F.O.C. of optimisation, ∀s ∈ S∗, assuming λbsz = +∞,
(∇Πbs(πbs)/θj) = (∇Πbs(πbs)/θj0 )(1 + ρ)
If LHS > RHS then b could have borrowed εθj more on the interbank market, bought ε
units more of asset j, sold (εθj/θj0 )(1+ρ) more units of asset j
0
to defray its loan and improve
its profits. Alternatively, if LHS < RHS, then b should have spent εθj less on asset j, thus
borrowing εθj less from the interbank market, sold (εθj/θj0 )(1 + ρ) less of asset j
0
improving
its profits. Note that this last option is feasible by (A2).
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Now consider a change in k. Suppose asset investments remain the same. Then either mb
or db should change to satisfy the new capital requirements. If mb changes then the argument
follows the proof of proposition 5. If db changes then market clearing requires ρ to change as
well. For profits to remain unchanged, by indecomposability some b is buying as well as selling
, some assets, say, j and j
0
. Thus (θj/θj0 ) should fall. But then j should have a seller who
buys another j
00
. So, (θj0/θj00 ) must also fall. Thus, we arrive out some bj which has already
been mentioned, and then (θj/θj0 )(θj0/θj00 )...(θj∗/θj) = 1 should be falling, a contradiction.
In the case of bankruptcy the previous argument is strengthened since ∇Πbs(πbs)/[Dhsz]+ < 0.¤
10.5 Proof of Proposition 4
(i) Assume not. since h 6= bh,σh(·) 6= σbh(·). W.l.o.g. consider the case that only vhsb1µhb1 6=
vhsb2µ
hb2 . Such s ∈ S exists since either ehsl 6= ebhsl or uh(·) 6= ubh(·) for some s ∈ S∗. Then,
Π
b1
s (·) 6= Πb2s (·), for s ∈ S∗, say Πb1s (·) > Πb2s (·). Since everything other action is the same, Mr.bhb2 could have reduced his investment in b2 by 4 and invest instead in b1 in t = 0. His net
gain would be 4(Πb1s −Πb2s ) > 0. From (5h), he could have used his extra cash to improve his
repayment rates, or if 4(4h) > 0 to increase his consumption and thus improve his pay oﬀ, a
contradiction.
(ii) Assume not, i.e. bank equity prices are the same. Since ub1s (·) 6= ub2s (·) for some
s ∈ S∗,σb1(·) 6= σb2(·). W.l.o.g. consider the case that vb1s > vb2s . This implies from (3b) that
Π
b1
s < Π
b2
s . Let bh reverse his action of (i) and so improve his payoﬀ, a contradiction.
(iii) Consider the case in which kt − kb1t > 0 but kt − kb2t = 0. Then, let bh reduce his
investment to b1 by 4 and instead increase his investment to b2 by 4, and thus increase his
payoﬀ, a contradiction. This act is aﬀordable by bh, since θb1s = θb2s . If Πb1s 6= Πb2s , for some
s ∈ S then let bh scale down his investment in both b1 and b2 by 42 and borrow 4 less and so
save 4vhsbµh
b
, yet another contradiction.
(iv) See Geanakoplos (1990)
(v) It follows immediately from the asset span theorem and the linearity of prices. ¤
10.6 Proof of Liquidity Structure of Interest Rates Proposition
By the argument of the theorem all p’s, θ’s, r’s, and ρ stay bounded. No h is left with unused
cash at t = 1, i.e. 4(5h) = 0, ∀ h ∈ H. Otherwise he could have borrowed 4/(1+rb) > 0 more
and spend it on some ls and improve his utility by ∇Πhs (χhs )4/(1 + rb)psl > 0. Then, h could
have used his left over cash 4 = 4(5h) to defray his loans. Similarly, no h ∈ H returns more
than what he owes. Finally, if h defaulted then he could have used his unused cash to reduce
his debt and improve his payoﬀ by λhs4. Similarly, for b ∈ B since rb > 0, ∀b ∈ B banks would
not leave cash unused in order to improve their last period profits. (Recall, banks maximise
Πbs(·), ∀ s ∈ S.
Thus, all cash is returned to the commercial banks and the equality follows ∀s ∈ S (for s = 0
cash may be transferred for use in the beginning of the next period). ¤
10.7 Proof of Quantity Theory of Money Proposition
Banks that hold idle cash, say 4, either they could have deposited it in the interbank market,
extend it in the credit market or invest it in the asset market and improve their payoﬀ by at
least ∇Πbs(πbs)4ρ > 0. Otherwise, they could have reduced their borrowing from the interbank
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market and thus save ρ4 interest repayment. Likewise, households if they are borrowers will
spend all of their cash; or else they should not have borrowed. If rb = 0, ∀b ∈ B still h should
not have borrowed thus letting some b deposit with the interbank market and improve profits
by ρ4. This, would improve his payoﬀ since P
h∈H
shb = 1, ∀ b ∈ B. (Note that for this household
h, if shb = 0 then he could have bought ε shb shares and borrowed (4− ε ψhb ) less and improve
his payoﬀ by at least ∇Πhs (χhs )(4− ε ψhb )/psl for some s ∈ S, l ∈ L.
If default in the asset markets occurs then adjust the previous arguments in case of asset
investments by λbs(1− vbsj)4 to induce the payoﬀ improvement.
By the same argument, at s = 0 all unused cash will be spent in the next period. ¤
10.8 Proof of Fisher Eﬀect Proposition
It follows immediately from the optimisation conditions. ¤
10.9 Proof of Proposition 5
As in proposition 3, from the FOC of optimisation ∀s ∈ S∗ and for some h ∈ H, assuming no
bankruptcy
∇Πhs (χhsl)/psl = (∇Πhs (χhsl0 )/psl0 )(1 + r
b)
Now consider a change in mCB (the same argument applies for changes in MCB or µCB).
Let the case not covered in proposition 3 occurs. By the liquidity structure of interest rate
rates proposition rb changes. To maintain the same consumptions, using indecomposability,
(psl/psl0 )(psl0/psl00 )...(psl∗/psl) = 1, should be falling, a contradiction. A fortiori, if [D
h
sz]
+ > 0
agents by reducing their borrowing by ε and adjusting their consumption by ε/psl and psl/psl0
accordingly to satisfy the FOC. In such a case, for high enough λhsz, his net gain in utility,
(λhszrb −∇Πhs (χhsl)/psl)ε > 0.
Remark: Investors’ indecomposability may be relaxed and then in case where the previous
argument does not hold then liquidation of bank will necessarily leave some h with4(5h) > 0.¤
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